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T

he Information Age has dawned, and it is maturing rapidly. How remarkable the celerity and scope at which the entire world is becoming
one far-flung network! As one pundit observed, "To a first approximation, all
computers in the world are connected to each other." Indeed, when one connects to the Internet, he or she is linked globally to all other computers on the
Internet. In 1999 there were nearly 200 million Internet users worldwide; by the
year 2003, at least another 100 million are expected to be on line.
Some have suggested that, in terms of technological progress, these are revolutionary times. Yet, as long ago as the decade after the orbiting of Sputnik, Soviet
authors wrote about a "Revolution in Military Affairs." The instrument that effected this particular revolution was the marriage of the intercontinental range
ballistic missile ,vith the nuclear weapon warhead. This combination meant that,
for the first time in history, strategic attacks (attacks with the potential to alter the
course and outcome ofa war, as opposed to an attack with the potential to alter the
course and outcome of, say, a battle, which would be at the tacticallevel) could be
conducted at any time against any target in the world. This was genuinely revolutionary, and had to be addressed by developing a wholly new set of concepts,
doctrines, and international rules. Today, the close-coupling of societies by
information technologies is beginning to portend the same effect-potentially a
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strategic effect-but without ~he necessity for nuclear weapons or long range
missilery. Just as the Soviets noticed something revolutionary going on, this is
also a major occurrence, but it is also a different kettle of fish.
While the Soviet "Revolution in Military Affairs" offered to produce strategic effects, the means to accomplish this end was centralized in the hands of
the State. For good or ill, the power was concentrated, and it was a power that
could be acquired only with significant technological effort and at great expense. Today, the potential for a strategic information systems attack has become a
reality. 1
What makes this so remarkably different is not only the effects that might be
produced without the use of nuclear weapons, but also the diffuse availability of
this power. The entry costs to conduct a strategic information attack are insignificant-an ineJ>.1'ensive computer, some easily obtainable software, and a simple
connection to the Internet. In theory, anyone just about anywhere can gain access and mount an information attack that might bring about devastating results.
Moreover, using this ubiquitous capability, strategic effects might be wrought
with little physical damage and no loss of life. Conceivably all national infrastructural components could be vulnerable: telecommunications; food, water,
oil, gas, and electrical distribution; health care; education; finance; industry; and
also military facilities, networks, command and control, and personnel.
Even more disconcerting, such strategic attacks can be conducted anonymously. Heretofore, the concentrated power of long-range nuclear weapons
was in the hands, and under the responsibility and accountability of, governmental officials. Military means, especially those with strategic consequences,
were tightly and centrally controlled. Time, technology, and the change in the
way in which societies create wealth have changed all that. Thomas Czel\vinski
has cautioned that "As the 'combat form' in any society follows the 'wealth creation form' of that society, the wars of the future will be predominantly, but not
solely, 'Information Wars.' "2
Now nameless, faceless actors can potentially attain strategic objectives; and
the possibility exists of not being able to identify the perpetrators and hold them
accountable. Because of the diffusion of power, the anonymity and ease of access, the speed at which attacks can be mounted, and the paucity of observable
preparation (resulting in little or no warning time), control or regulation of
cyberspace attacks, as might be attempted by legal means, seems almost beyond
comprehension. Yet, efforts must be made, for the stakes are high.
To ascertain at what points legal instruments might be effective either in preventing attacks or in mitigating their consequences, the ingredients of an attack
can be factored into five parts for analysis.
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• Objectives to be sought. These could range from overturning the ruling
political power to the infliction of sheer pain.
• Actors with motivation. Motivations might be political, anarchic, criminal,
monetary, or merely to vandalize.
• Inexpensive, easy-to-use tools. Low expense and ease of attaining powerful
tools increase the potential for their use.
• Access to a variety of targets almost too numerous to count. A key route of
access would be via the Internet.
• Wide-ranging results, from mere copying of information (no direct injury
from the act) to contaminating the water supply of a large metropolitan
area, to sparking economic chaos, to causing the release of a weapon of
mass destruction.
Recognizing that these categories are interdependent, it is nevertheless useful to
break each of them out for individual discussion.

Objectives
Access to information empowers. Someone who has the ability to review and
change a pay schedule or an academic grade, for example, wields significant
power. A person with access to private or classified information can use that information in a variety of ways, not all of which are beneficial or lawful. If the
stakes are high enough, the temptation to copy, or alter, or pilfer information
can be very strong.
Objectives for obtaining, altering, or obliterating information can vary, depending on the kind ofinformation, its potential uses and value, and the ease in
accessing it. Conceivably, governments could be toppled by a malefactor with
the right information. The sheer volume of information flow-in the form of
e-mail, financial transactions, and telephone calls, for example--means that if
only a very small fraction is corrupted, intercepted, or stolen, enormous problems can ensue. Each day over a trillion dollars circulates electronically in the
global currency market, and in excess of nine billion e-mail messages are sent in
the United States alone. An error, loss, or siphoning rate in the currency market
of only one one-hundredth of one percent (.0001) equates to more than
$100,000,000. Numbers (and tolerances) such as these border on theincomprehensible. Consider the potential damage that could be wrought by an unauthorized person changing a bank's financial records by a simple instruction such as
"change all sevens to ones." Or even more deviously, change every third seven
to a one. Or, perhaps, change the first one thousand sevens to ones, change the
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second two thousand fours to twos. Such instructions are trivial for someone
with very modest computer literacy to compose, but the difficulty and cost to
repair the damage could be significant.
Information has the special property that it can exist in more than one place at
one time. This is at the same time an advantage and a disadvantage; for example,
decision makers can view and act on the same information simultaneously, even
though they are "videly separated by distance. On the other hand, it can permit
the compromise of valuable or sensitive information without its owner's
knowledge.
Information also frequendy has an element of timeliness; that is, information
can be so perishable that it can have great value at one point in time and be
worthless at a later-or conceivably even an earlier-time. Thus, the value of
information depends on its availability, its integrity, and its confidentiality.
For those who would seek to attack the information of others, these would be
the targets. Availability includes the loss ofinformation, delay in its receipt, and the
loss or delay of an information service. Integrity includes unauthorized changes in
the information or the introduction of false data. Confidentiality means the
unauthorized access to data or information that has some requirement for protection or privacy. In some cases, no damage to the data will result from e::-.-ploitation.
The data might be undisturbed, but its revelation could have severe repercussions.
An additional complication is presented by the medium of" cyberspace." Because cyberspace is viewed as a virtual realm, it carries an aura of unreality. From
his bedroom, a young hacker connects to the Internet, travels thousands of miles
in seconds, enters the computer system ofa large corporation, and views the data
contained on storage devices there. His unauthorized presence mayor may not
be detected. Ifhe destroys data on the storage device, by a mere series of keystrokes on his keyboard, there is no fire, smoke, or noise. The informationjust
disappears. The tactile experience, the physical environment in all its manifestations, the sense ofpersonal danger, and the resultant damage from such an activity are unreal, truly virtual. They are far removed from an actual, corporal
breaking and entering, but the transgression is the same.
Have any cyberspace events taken place to the extent that severe consequences, either monetary loss or damage to national security, resulted? To date,
there is litde evidence to support such a claim, but it is well within the realm of
the possible. One might not know whether such attacks have taken place, in
part, because ifany institution suffers a loss, it has great incentives to suppress that
fact. Confidence of investors or customers can be gready undermined by such a
revelation. Moreover, the fact that an institution was attacked and suffered losses
can inspire additional attacks on other institutions. But central to the issue of
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objectives, one must analyze what gain might accrue to the perpetrator of such
acts. If the objective is sheer malice, or to inflict pain with no anticipation of
gain, then protection is at the level of maximum difficulty. The same is true of
terrorism, for example. If terrorists have an agenda or an objective, one seeks to
deter them by withholding the objective. In effect, they are told, "You might be
able to injure me, and to inflict great pain on me, but you cannot attain what you
seek--so you might as well not even make the attempt." If, on the other hand,
terrorists intend only to cause pain and suffering, and they place litde or no value
on their own lives or prospects, then they become exceedingly difficult to deter. 3
If, rather than wanton damage, the objective is monetary gain, political
change, or competitive advantage, it is helpful for the defender to try to anticipate or envision the objectives of the perpetrator. In that way, the defender can
erect active or passive defenses to try to thwart an attack or to minimize or otherwise manage the consequences of a successful attack.

Actors
Closely coupled to the question ofobjectives is the issue ofactors. In information attack it has become a simple matter for anyone, virtually anywhere, to gain
unauthorized access to information. This means, literally, that any modesdy literate person who has minimum capabilities in computing can be a participant in
information attack or exploitation. From the lowest level (drawing moustaches
on billboards or spray painting subway cars) to the highest (gaining unauthorized
access to the information held by a large corporation or government), the difference in capability of the actor is remarkably small. This means that children can
be recruited and taught the necessary skills; indeed many ofthe identified "hackers" have been minors. 4 The entry fee, in short, is low in terms ofcapability, and
tends to be low in terms of age as well.
As a special commission reported to the President of the United States:
Like any new tool in previous eras, computers can be used by those who prey on
the innocent. International narcotics traffickers now routinely communicate
\vith each other via computer messages. Hostile governments and even some
transnational organizations are establishing cyber-warfare efforts, assigned the
mission ofcrippling America's domestic infrastructure through computer attacks.
Hackers destroy cyber-property by defacing homepages and maliciously
manipulating private information. Pedophiles stalk unsuspecting children in
computer chat roolTIS. Individuals post homepages with instructions to
manufacture pipe bombs, chemical weapons, and even biological agents. Crooks
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break into business computers, either stealing funds directly or extorting
payments from companies an...a.ous to avoid more expensive disruption.
Disgruntled employees, with valid access to their companies' system, can take
steps to disrupt the business operations or steal proprietary, sensitive, and financial
information. And our personal data is at risk ofbeing unlawfully accessed and read
by malicious individuals, without our knowledge, as it resides on or traverses
communications and computer networks. S

No longer is espionage something undertaken exclusively-or, perhaps,
even primarily-by professional spies in highly adversarial countries; the field is
now open to rank amateurs on a global basis, with or without political, cultural,
or religious axes to grind. No longer is sabotage reserved to anarchists, social activists, or well trained enemies of the State; the electronic environment of
cyberspace makes it widely available for the doing. Actors may perform their activities in singular privacy, without personal mentoring and a modicum of instruction. Alternatively, they may be organized and scripted by
anti-government groups, or as part ofa government or industrial team. Accordingly, security forces guarding against electronic attack or e).-ploitation will have
great difficulty in "profiling" potential perpetrators.
State-supported acts are in a class of their own. As noted, however, they
might well be indistinguishable from mere "hacking." The non-governmental
culture that underwrites computer network attacks (CNA), however, knows no
international boundaries, and it tends toward alienation and hostility. Here is an
excerpt of the "Hacker's Manifesto," in which can be heard echoes of the ravings of the infamous Unabomber:
This is our world now ... the world of the electron and the s\vitch, the beauty of
the baud. We make use ofa service already existing without paying for what could
be dirt cheep [sic] if it wasn't run by profiteering gluttons, and you call us
criminals. We explore ... and you call us criminals. We exist without skin color,
without nationality, without religious bias ... and you call us criminals. You build
atomic bombs, wage wars, murder, cheat, and lie to us and try to make us believe
it is for our own good, yet we're the criminal.... Yes, I am a criminal. My crime is
that ofcuriosity.... My crime is that ofoutsmarting you, something that you will
never forgive me for. I am a hacker and this is my manifesto. You may stop this
individual, but you can't stop us all ... after all, we're all alike. 6

Among the most feared and powerful of all actors in attacks on information
are insiders. In part, this is because the strength and integrity of a network is
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largely a matter of perception. From an outsider's point of view, a network
might appear very robust. It has many nodes, many links, many alternatives to
routing information, and good security. To an insider who knows the network,
there might appear to be a substantial number of vulnerabilities. An outsider is
reluctant to attack what seems to him to be a very difficult, very adaptive target.
The insider, however, knows the system and its potential weaknesses. This is
why the insider is ofsuch high concern-he's inside the firewall, inside the security. His trustworthiness and reliability then ascend to the level ofpivotal issues.
Motivation of actors must be viewed as a major variable in the process. For
one who acts from the outside, the rewards might be monetary, political, religious, or perhaps just personal satisfaction. For an insider, the motivations might
be much less consequential. Changes in workplace environment or relationships, revenge, malicious acts at the behest of an outsider, the challenge, sheer
curiosity, or even a misguided good-faith effort to fix a problem can all stimulate
an insider to action that could be exceedingly damaging and cosdy.
Because" cyberspace" has been so ill-defined, because it was initially commandeered by the youth of the world, because it is so easily accessible, and because it is
global and instantaneous, almost anyone can become an actor within its confines.

Tools
On a daily basis, new tools for attacking networks are honed and made available via the Internet to anyone who wants them. Many are free merely for the
downloading. According to Bruce Middleton, an expert on the subject, "The
most popular of these tools fall into several categories: password crackers, port
scanners, war dialers, general network vulnerability scanners, and intrusion detection systems."7
Because many firewalls and other security devices require a password to
breach them, password crackers attempt to determine what the user's password
might be. It is a well-known fact that the most \videly used password, owing to
the fact that employees are lazy and do not understand (or often care about) security, is "PASSWORD." Easy-to-crack passwords involve variations of people's
names, their addresses, their pet's names, or the names or nicknames of their
favorite sports team. If a match fails on these easy passwords, the password
cracker employs a dictionary that very rapidly tries words until the password
is discovered. In general, the password cracker can no longer just try each potential word at the locked door (firewall) of the target site, for now most sites can
detect such efforts and will not accept password attempts beyond about three.
So, some other method must be used, such as locating the password file on the
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victim's computer and trying to decrypt it, or catching passwords "on the fly"
with a "sniffer."
Port scanners "knock on the door" of networks to see if they are unlocked.
Many, many computers and services connected to the Internet, for example,
have no protection against penetration. Port scanners try to find these unprotected ports and then gain access to information on the victim computer. Many
of the "no need to dial up" or "on all the time" services (Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and "Web TV" fall into this category) can place their users
in a vulnerable position if they do not include security services. It is the function
of port scanners to find those unsecured computers. "Strobe" is an example of
such a scanner. It "attempts to locate and build a picture of all ports on one or
several hosts in a given network, using what is considered a very efficient algorithm that helps optimize speed. It then displays all those ports that are turned on,
or 'listening.' "8 Strobe is available on the Internet at no costY
War dialers organize banks or networks of modems to dial the same number
repeatedly in order to overload it or keep it from receiving other signals, or they
might dial many numbers rapidly in the hope of detecting a computer on the
other end. These can be very effective in situations where computers are networked but also employ modems to the outside via phone lines. Often computers are manufactured with internal modems installed. Users then merely have to
connect their computers to a telephone line, and they can operate in cyberspace
outside the firewall that protects the network to which their computers are also
attached. Because users can connect to the outside directly, the "outside" can
also enter their computers via this route, around the firewall or protective device. War dialers are easy to implement, and can be used with devastating effects
on a targeted site.
General network vulnerability scanners. Perhaps the most famous of these is
SATAN, the Security Administrator's Tool for Analyzing Networks. It has
many functions and has been available, also for free, literally for years on the
Internet. SATAN analyzes a target computer system and provides the user a detailed report on the kind of equipment, directories, and hosts supported.
Intrusion detection systems help secure computer systems. They have a variety of
bells and whistles, some ofwhich are detailed record keeping ofattempted intrusions, alerts to operators of attacks, and recommended actions to correct the
problem or even to respond. In this class one finds ISS SafeSuite, Cisco Net
Ranger, NAI CyberCop, and AXENT Technologies NetRecon, to mention
only a few.
In addition to these technical tools, there are also "social tools" commonly in
use. For example, there is "dumpster diving," where trash is screened for
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passwords, file infonnation, personal infonnation, and any other data that might
aid a perpetrator's efforts. This is a common procedure; it has been used for
years, and it still pays off. Often, anned either with the material gathered from
dumpster diving or sheer gall, a potential attacker will then engage in what has
become known as "social engineering." For example, a telephone call will be
made to an employee in the targeted organization and a misrepresentation made
in order to elicit the compromise ofprotected infonnation. A common ruse is to
call an employee and pretend to be an "infonnation management systems troubleshooter." The employee is told that the system is experiencing difficulties,
and that the employee's system name and password are needed to fix the problem. For many of the same reasons that "password" has the highest frequency of
usage, this technique is very often successful, because it takes advantage of the
propensity of people to pay little attention to security.
Peter G. Neumann has summarized quite succinctly the potential for "computer misuse," in the table reproduced below:
Misuse type

Mode
External
Visual spving
Misrepresentation
Physical scavenging
Hardware misuse
Logical scavenging

Observing ofkevstrokes or screens
Deceiving operators and users
Dumpster-diving for printout
Examining discarded/stolen media
Intercepting electronic or other data
lamming, electronic or otherwise

Eavesdropping
Interference
Physical attack

Damaging or modifYing equipment,
power

Physical removal

Removing equipment and storage
media

Masquerading
Impersonation

Using false identities external to
computer systems

Piggybacking attacks

Usurping communication lines,
workstations
Using playback, creating bogus nodes
and systems

Spoofing attacks
Network weaving

Masking physical whereabouts or
routing
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Setting up opportunities for further
misuse
Implanting malicious code, sending
letter bombs
Setting time or event bombs (a form
ofTroian horse)
Acquiring distributed resources
Attaching to programs and replicating
Avoiding authentication and authority
Utilizing existing flaws
Password cracking, hacking tokens

Pest programs
Trojan horse attacks
Logic bombs
Malevolent worms
Virus attacks
Bypasses
Trapdoor attacks
Authorization attacks
Active misuse

Writing, using, with apparent
authorization
Creating, modifying, using, denying
service, entering false or misleading
data
Using salami attacks
Perpetrating saturation attacks
Reading. with apparent authorization

Basic active misuse

Incremental attacks
Denials of service
Passive misuse
Browsing
Interference, aggregation

Making random or selective searches
EAl'loiting database inferences and
traffic analysis
Exploiting covert channels or other
data leakage

Covert channels

Willfully failing to perform e}.l'ected
du~es.' or committing errors of
onnSSlOn
Preparing for subsequent misuses, as in
off-line preencryptive matching,
factoring large numbers to obtain
private keys, autodialer scanning

Inactive misuse

Indirect misuse

Source: Peter G. Neumann, Computer-Related Risks (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1995).

Targets
The variety of objectives, the multiplicity of actors, and the great array of
tools together are a clear indicator that the target set is large and rich. Targets
range from very specific systems, persons, or infrastructures that are linked
tighdy with a perpetrator's objectives, to sheer random, serendipitous discoveries. Depending on the motivation of attackers and the tools available to them,
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the attack might be precisely focused on a known, discrete target; or it might
take the form of a blunt, across-the-board destructive blow to an entire information system. The attacker might use a variety of techniques to gain access,
and the effort might take a long time-perhaps spanning months, or even
years.
Monetary flows and financial databases, because they offer the prospect of
great gain with comparatively low pain or risk, are prime targets. Presumably,
the greater the sensitivity or the value ofinformation, the more carefully it will
be protected. This is only a presumption, however, because many information
systems and vital services were designed, and constructed-and they are operated-\vith no conception of, or attention to, any threat.
National infrastructures have come under increasingly intense scrutiny in recent years as potential targets for information attack. Because of the growing
danger, President Clinton, onJuly 15, 1996, issued Executive Order 13010 establishing a Presidential Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection
(PCCIP). Chaired by retired Air Force General Robert T. Marsh, the commission identified eight infrastructures that must be protected from the depredations ofinformation and other kinds of attack. These were: electrical power, gas
and oil (storage and transportation), telecommunications, banking and finance,
transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical,
police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government services. The PCCIP
presented the results of its inquiry in October 1997.
Another attractive target is the US Department ofDefense. The Deputy Secretary ofDefense testified in 1998 that "95 percent ofall of our communications
now go over public infrastructure-public telephone lines, telephone switches,
computer systems, et cetera."10 Much of this departmental information is routine and administrative, which is not to say that it is unimportant. Virtually all 10gistics and medical information on service members travels over the public
infrastructure, for example. If antagonists were unaware of such a dependency
before, they clearly are now mindful of that vulnerability, and one prudently
must assume that they are planning ways to exploit it.
If, indeed, essentially all computers in the world are connected, then that constitutes about as target-rich an environment as can be imagined.

Results
The horizons being very wide and deep for information operations, and specifically computer network attack, the results also occupy a broad spectrum.
From a mere nuisance ofdefacing a web page with a political message to the loss
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of great amounts of money, or potentially lives, the results vary with the objectives, attackers, tools, and targets, as well as the vigor, and the rigor, with which
targets are defended.
Exhortations have been raised that the United States is a prime candidate for
an "Electronic Pearl Harbor." Those who issued such a warning meant that the
United States is unprepared and not watching very closely, can be surprised, and
that the results might well be truly shocking. Of course, beyond the initial
trauma, what Pearl Harbor (and the subsequent declarations of war) accomplished was to anger the American public and focus it laser-sharp on conducting
war against the Axis powers. Given these facts, some argue that the reason more
catastrophic events have not occurred-bringing down the Internet, for example, which some have contended is possible-is that potential attackers fear the
"post-Pearl Harbor" backlash.
To date, no catastrophic event has occurred because of computer network attack. Estimates ofloss are difficult to make and for that reason often lack credibility. Ifa particular company is prevented from doing business on the Internet for,
sayan hour, what is the cost of that? Was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity
missed, with incalculable costs? Opportunity costs are especially difficult to estimate, and that is frequendy what is lost in a computer network attack.
So, results could vary from the time lost to clean up the graffiti on a defaced
website to, perhaps, billions of dollars in a financial transaction, drug deal, or ex'tortion. National infrastructures could be successfully attacked by CNA, with
very disruptive results, and perhaps high innocent loss of life.
The potential to wreak great damage virtually anywhere in the world, almost
instantaneously, at very low cost, by almost anyone is imminent. International
law offers a prospective tool to attempt to help control or mitigate the potential
dangers. Each of the ingredients of an attack listed above offers a possible pressure point for legal application. As analyses and discussions on the subject proceed, these five points can provide a useful framework upon which to build. 11
Notes
1. Distinctions have been made in the literature of information warfare between data,
information, knowledge, and wisdom. This essay deals with tangibles: information is data that has
been organized or assessed in some manner. Knowledge and wisdom have no independent existence
outside the observer. Data and information exist regardless of whether they are known or
interpreted.
2. Thomas J. Czerwinski, The Third Wave: What the ToJIlers Never Told You, 3 STRATEGIC
FORUM #72 (1996).
3. For an extended discussion, see Roger W. Barnett, ['ifonl/ation OperatiollS, Deterrence, and the
Use of Force, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Spring 1998, at 7-19.
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4. "Hackers" seek to differentiate between themselves and "crackers." They view the latter as
malicious, irresponsible social elements, while they, merely in the interest of science--or perhaps
helpfulness-are doing no harm.
5. William Cohen, Janet Reno, William Daley, and Jacob J. Lew, Preserving America's
Privacy and Security in the Next Century: A Strategy for America in Cyberspace, A Report to the
President of the United States, September 16, 1999.
6. Revelation and LOA [Legion of the Apocalypse], The Ultimate Beginner's Guide to
Hacking and Phreaking, Volume 2, April 1, 1997.
7. Btuce Middleton, Using the Hacker's Toolbox, SECURITY MANAGEMENT MAGAZINE,June
1999, www.securitymanagement.com.

8.Id.
9. According to Middleton, supra note 7, most of these free tools can be acquired at:
tip:// coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools.
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